Mind-brain identity

Axel, and others, have been revising for their 'philosophy of mind' exam. They've been revising Davidson, and others. They have been discussing mind-brain identity theories.
I think I have discovered why those theories are rubbish. They assume what they set out to prove; they beg the question. The brain is in the head, and it is the process or events of the brain which we are seeking to identify with feelings, perceptions and such of the mind.
Where is the mind? The preliminary considerations of identity theorists always already locate the mind in the region of the head. The mind is not self-evidently in the head, since that is one of the things identity theorists are attempting to demonstrate. So if we lose this absurd assumption (absurd, given what they are trying to prove), there are two obvious difficulties: 1) when I plunge a hypodermic needle into my heroin-hungry arm, the 'pricking pain' of the needle is felt, if anywhere, in the arm. It is very certainly not in the head. If you knee-cap someone, then ask them where it hurts, the answer would be an incredulous "in my knee you fucking psychopath."
2) Not all mental 'events' are like this though. Anguish, for example, could not be said to be anywhere: it is non-material, governed only by our temporal inner sense.
So certain feelings can be felt around the body, and others are no more in the head than on Pluto. I struggle to see what kind of identity could hold between these so located mental events and a physical event in the brain.